Significant scientific and technological advances in intensive care have been made. However, patients in the intensive care unit may experience discomfort, loss of control, and surreal experiences. This has generated relevant debates about how to humanize the intensive care units and whether humanization is necessary at all. This paper aimed to explore how humanizing intensive care is described in the literature. A scoping review was performed. Studies published between 01.01.1999 and 02.03.2020 were identified in the CINAHL, Embase, PubMed, and Scopus (...) databases. After removing 185 duplicates, 363 papers were screened by title and abstract. Full-text screening of 116 papers led to the inclusion of 68 papers in the review based on the inclusion criteria; these papers mentioned humanizing or dehumanizing intensive care in the title or abstract. Humanizing care was defined as holistic care, as a general attitude of professionals toward patients and relatives and an organizational ideal encompassing all subjects of the healthcare system. Technology was considered an integral component of intensive care that must be balanced with caring for the patient as a whole and autonomous person. This holistic view of patients and relatives could ameliorate the negative effects of technology. There were geographical differences and the large number of studies from Spain and Brazil reflect the growing interest in humanizing intensive care in these particular countries. In conclusion, a more holistic approach with a greater emphasis on the individual patient, relatives, and social context is the foundation for humanizing intensive care, as reflected in the attitudes of nurses and other healthcare professionals. Demands for mastering technology may dominate nurses’ attention toward patients and relatives; therefore, humanized intensive care requires a holistic attitude from health professionals and organizations toward patients and relatives. Healthcare organizations, society, and regulatory frameworks demanding humanized intensive care may enforce humanized intensive care. (shrink)

The present narrative review addresses issues concerning the defining criteria and conceptual underpinnings of pain catastrophizing. To date, the concept of pain catastrophizing has been extensively used in many clinical and experimental contexts and it is considered as one of the most important psychological correlate of pain chronicity and disability. Although its extensive use, we are still facing important problems related to its defining criteria and conceptual understanding. At present, there is no general theoretical agreement of what catastrophizing really is. (...) The lack of a consensus on its definition and conceptual issues has important consequences on the choice of the pain management approaches, defining and identifying problems, and promoting novel research. Clinical and research work in absence of a common theoretical ground is often trivial. It is very surprising that clinical and experimental work has grown extensively in the past years, without a common ground in the form of a clear definition of pain catastrophizing and overview of its conceptual basis. Improving the efficacy and efficiency of pan catastrophizing related treatments requires an understanding of the theoretical construct. So far, most interventions have only demonstrated modest effects in reducing pain catastrophizing. Therefore, clarifying the construct may be an important precursor for developing more targeted and effective interventions, thereby easing some of the burden related to this aspect of pain. In our review, we have extracted and de-constructed common elements that emerge from different theoretical models with the aim to understand the concept of catastrophizing, which components can be modulated by psychological interventions, and the general role in pain processing. The analysis of the literature has indicated essential key elements to explain pain catastrophizing: emotional regulation, catastrophic worry, rumination, behavioral inhibition and behavioral activation systems, and interoceptive sensitivity. The present paper attempts to integrate these key elements with the aim to re-compose and unify the concept within a modern biopsychosocial interpretation of catastrophizing. (shrink)

Nowadays, special attention is given to the hazards associated with genetic engineering and new inventions in biotechnology, and in fear of severe consequences, researchers, institutions and governments are required to act responsibly. The term “responsibility” may be defined in numerous ways. The definition considered in this paper, is one we believe is in common use: “Generally speaking, a person has a special responsibility for a particular outcome if they knowingly brought it about and it would not exist if not for (...) what they did”. This concept of moral responsibility rests on what we term the three ‘I's’: individual, intentional and informed. Responsibility is individual in the sense that it must be directed towards someone. A second requirement of moral responsibility presupposes the ability to do otherwise, i.e. it presupposes each human being as an intentional actor, capable of acting according to his/her own free will. In order for someone to be responsible for their actions, the choice between alternatives must be informed. The article focus' on these three aspects of responsibility in order to reveal how difficult it is to apply and make sense of this definition with regard to new inventions in science. (shrink)

In this article, I argue we have collective duties to people who suffer from kidney failure and these duties are best fulfilled through a government-monopsony market in kidneys. A government-monopsony market is a model where the government is the sole buyer, and kidneys are distributed according to need, not ability to pay. The framework of collective duties enables us to respond to several of the most pressing ethical and practical objections to kidney markets, including Cécile Fabre's objection that it is (...) unjust to be paid to do one's duty, Simon Rippon's objections that it is harmful to be pressured to sell a kidney and that a market is unfair, Richard Titmuss's crowding out objection, and Ronald Dworkin's objection that body parts should not be among the goods we owe each other. (shrink)

Kai Nielsen is one of Canada's most distinguished political philosophers. In a career spanning over 40 years, he has published more than 400 papers in political philosophy, ethics, meta-philosophy, and philosophy of religion. Pessimism of the Intellect presents a thoughtful collection of Nielsen's essays complemented by an extended reflective interview with Nielsen. This collection allows the reader to grasp the systematic scope of his thought and methodology.

Worldwide 1.2 million people are dying from kidney failure each year, and in the USA alone, approximately 100 000 people are currently on the waiting list for a kidney transplant. One possible solution to the kidney shortage is for governments to pay donors for one of their healthy kidneys and distribute these kidneys according to need. There are, however, compelling objections to this government-monopsony model. To avoid these objections, I propose a small adjustment to the model. I suggest we reward (...) kidney sellers with both money and a ceremony that celebrates their noble act. They should, in other words, receive a prize rather than a price. (shrink)

Organ shortage is a major survival issue for millions of people worldwide. Globally 1.2 million people die each year from kidney failure. In this paper, we critically examine and find lacking extant proposals for increasing organ supply, such as opting in and opt out for deceased donor organs, and parochial altruism and paired kidney exchange for live organs. We defend two ethical solutions to the problem of organ shortage. One is to make deceased donor organs automatically available for transplant without (...) requiring consent from the donor or their relatives. The other is for society to buy nonvital organs in a strictly regulated market and provide them to people in need for free. (shrink)

When addressing the Muslim women question, one of the problematic issues is the centrality of a religious tradition or a political ideology as a primary subject of inquiry. Muslim women are seen as the embodiment of a singular tradition or ideology, as in the case of Turkey, where the contemporary headscarf-wearing women are represented as ‘Islamist’. In this project, I aim to problematise this stereotyping categorisation through ontological conceptualisations, inspired by the French thinker Gilles Deleuze. To implement the relational ontology (...) of Deleuze, I examine headscarf contestations in Turkey through interviews conducted in two women’s organisations in Turkey: Capital City Women’s Platform (Baskent Kadin Platformu) and Hazar. I argue that the world constantly ‘becomes’ through flows of relations between multiple elements; therefore, it is a multiplicity, an intensity and fractured. With this Deleuzian ontology in mind, I consider the quotidian physical, material and social resources of my interviews with the aim of elucidating relations between a female body and the commodities produced by multiple socio-economic and political factors in Turkey. Then I address a Deleuzian understanding of categorisations such as class, gender, race and ideology. These categorisations, for Deleuze, are aggregations of multiplicities and fluidities forming specific fixations according to a range of ascribed characteristics, such as income, education, employment or dress codes. In this regard, I conclude that the label ‘Islamist’ restrains the relational and multiple characters of headscarf practices within a unifying category by attributing certain features to particular embodiments and materials. (shrink)

Which party characteristics contribute to the representation of young legislators? We examine this question quantitatively, focusing on the European Parliament, and gauge the influence of the age of the party leader, the age of the party, the size of its support, party ideology and party nomination procedures on the age of politicians, based on data of all members who have served in the EP. We find that none of these characteristics matter substantively in explaining young representatives’ presence and discuss ways (...) to further the field of research on youth representation. Online Appendix. (shrink)

Can ethical character be stimulated and enabled? Cognitive understanding of organizational ethics issues is important and necessary, but not sufficient. Ethical behavior does not emerge automatically. Effective political method is necessary. While it may be difficult to teach ethical character, nonetheless, skill development with respect to joined ethics understanding and action-learning methods can help us develop the skills and confidence we need to actualize our ethical characters and social concerns. An action-learning approach to organizational ethics can help stimulate and enable (...) ethical character. (shrink)

Aurora, eller Morgenrøde er en enestående tekst fra højmiddelalderen, der knytter tanker og billeder fra Bibelen sammen med naturfilosofiske forestillinger om naturens ånd. Denne sammenstillingvar ny og udfordrende for datidens tænkemåde. Derfor blev teksten forbudt, gemt af vejen og først genfundet og udgivet i moderne tid. Det forhold, at Aurora, eller Morgenrøde skulle være skrevet af den berømte middelalderfilosof, Thomas Aquinas, som dennes sidstevidnesbyrd kort før han døde i 1274, er blevet afvist, ikke mindst af kirken. Ny forskning åbner imidlertid (...) spørgsmålet igen. I bogen her fortæller Aksel Haaning i tolv indledende kapitler den utrolige historie om glemte erfaringer af naturens liv fra europæisk filosofi og spiritualitet, herunder de ofte oversete bidrag fra arabisk kultur. De enkelte kapitler kan læses hver for sig, men udgør et samletbud på, hvordan fortid og nutid griber ind i hinanden. Når Haaning fortæller, står glemte tekster og tanker lyslevende for den moderne læser. Ifølge forfatteren, der har nærlæst de ældste kilder og håndskrifter, afspejler Aurora-teksten også et eksistentielt drama, der udspiller sig i vores eget forhold til natur"-- Back cover. (shrink)

Do we have stronger duties to assist in emergencies than in nonemergencies? According to Peter Singer and Peter Unger, we do not. Emergency situations, they suggest, merely serve to make more salient the very extensive duties to assist that we always have. This view, while theoretically simple, appears to imply that we must radically revise common-sense emergency norms. Resisting that implication, theorists like Frances Kamm, Jeremy Waldron, and Larry Temkin suggest that emergencies are indeed normatively exceptional. While their approach is (...) more in line with common-sense, however, it is theoretically less simple, and it is has proven difficult to justify the exception. In this paper we propose a model of emergencies that we call the Informal-Insurance Model, and explain how this can be used to combine theoretical simplicity with common-sense emergency norms. (shrink)

The global allocation of vaccines during the COVID-19 pandemic is widely perceived as unfair. Priority was given to countries that paid the most with little or no concern for who needed the vaccines the most. No satisfactory institutions have been established to allocate vaccines in a future pandemic. In this paper, we join reformers in proposing a new scheme for vaccine distribution: a global auction for vaccines where profits are distributed fairly to participating countries. Our proposal improves upon previous suggestions (...) morally by taking countries’ differing valuations of money and vaccines seriously. Since an auction is in the interest of both vaccine manufacturers and high-income countries, it is also politically feasible. A global redistributive auction for vaccines thus promises to be a robust and morally desirable way to allocate vaccines. -/- . (shrink)

English summary: Provocative Public Philosophy In 2017, I argued that people with Down syndrome cannot live full lives. This sparked a heated debated in the Norwegian public sphere. This gave rise to a debate over what academics should and should not say in public. A certain form of public philosophy, what I will call provocative public philosophy, was criticized for being harmful, imperialistic, for eroding trust in philosophers, and for creating too much noise. In this article I will, in light (...) of the Down syndrome debate, defend provocative public philosophy against these allegations. -/- Norsk sammendrag: En uttalelse om at personer med Downs syndrom ikke kan leve fullverdige liv, satte i gang en stor og opphetet debatt i den norske offentligheten i 2017. Denne ga opphav til en mer overordnet debatt om hva akademikere bør og ikke bør si i offentligheten. En viss form for offentlig filosofi, det jeg vil kalle provokativ offentlig filosofi, er blitt utpekt som synder. I denne artikkelen vil jeg, med utgangspunkt i debatten om fullverdige liv, forsvare provokativ offentlig filosofi mot både epistemiske og etiske innvendinger. (shrink)

Metaphilosophy is itself philosophy about philosophy. It is not something before or independent of philosophy. Both Kai Nielsen and Richard Rorty are deeply concerned (someone might say obsessively preoccupied) with metaphilosophy. They both are thoroughly historicist and contextualist resolutely rejecting any form of a transcendental or metaphysical turn. They argue against claims to absolute validity (as well as against absolutism in any form) and a natural order of reasons: some 'Reason' to which any rational agent must be committed. They (...) both see philosophy as a transitional genre first (historically speaking) from religion then metaphysics and more latterly from scientistic conceptions of the world. But they differ about what philosophy is transitional to. For Rorty it is historical narrative and utopian proposals; for Nielsen it is critical theory. Rorty claims this, Nielsen's intentions to the contrary notwithstanding, commits him to enlightenment rationalism. Nielsen replies that his form of critical theory is deeply historicist and contextual without being resolutely atheoretical. This plays out in political orientation to Nielsen's being a socialist while Rorty is a social democrat. (shrink)

Müslüman kadınların İslami gelenekler tarafından bastırılmış mı özgürlüğe kavuşturulmuş mu olduğuna dair pek çok çalışma bulunmakta. Bu çalışmalardan bazıları başörtüsü gibi İslami geleneklerin bir baskı unsuru olarak görürken, bazıları da Müslüman kadınların bu gelenekleri uygularken kendi iradelerini ortaya koyduğunu, dolayısıyla bu geleneklerin bir baskı emaresi olarak görülemeyeceğini savunur. Bu çalışmada, Müslüman kadınların hayatlarının çok yönlü, ilişkisel ve mekân bağlamında şekillendiğini incelememizi sağlayacak, Deleuze felsefisi bağlamında ele alınan irade ve özgürlük kavramlarını kullanmak amaçlanmıştır. Diğer bir ifade ile Fransız filozof Gilles Deleuze (...) tarafından ortaya koyulan ilişkisel ontoloji Müslüman Kadın çalışmalarını sorgulamak için kullanılmaktadır. Bu ilişkisel ontoloji üzerinden, Müslüman kadınların dini söylemler çerçevesinde olumsuz resmedilmeleri sorgulanmakta ve bu kadınların deneyimlerine ve pratiklerine dair alternatif açıklamalar ortaya konulmaktadır. Böylece, Deleuze’in felsefesi bağlamında ele alınan irade ve özgürlük kavramları kullanılarak Müslüman kadınların dini katılım ve uygulamaları üzerinden pasif ve irade göstermeyen kadınlar olarak tasvir edilmesi sorgulanmaktadır. Müslüman kadınların durumsal uygulama ve deneyimlerini keşfedebilecek nitelikte akademik bir bakış açısı önerilmektedir. Özet: Bazı batılı kuruluşlar medeniyetler çatışması söylemini temel alarak tekil bir Müslüman dünyası tarif edip bu tek tipleştirilmiş tarifi Islama ve Müslümanlara karşı mücadele etmenin neden gerekli olduğunu gerekçelendirmek için kullanmaktadır. Müslüman kadınlar İslam gelenekleri ve Müslüman erkekler tarafından baskıya uğrayan bir gurup olarak resmedildiği için, bu söylemlerde Müslüman kadınlara dair konular önemli odak noktalarından birisi olmaktadır. Örneğin Müslüman kadın kimliğinin sembolü olarak görülen başörtüsünün bir baskı unsuru olup olmadığına dair tartışmalar görülür. Müslüman kadının başörtüsü ile bastırılmış mı özgürleştirilmiş mi olduğuna dair pek çok çalışma da bulunmaktadır. Bu çalışmalardan bazıları başörtüsü gibi İslami geleneklerin Müslüman kadınları baskıladığını ileri sürerken bazıları da kadınlar başörtüsü kullandığında bunu kendi iradeleri ile yaptığını tartışır. Örneğin Saba Mahmood irade, özgürlük, istek ve direnme gibi kavramların liberalizm temelinde anlaşılmasını sorgulayarak Müslüman kadınlar hakkındaki bu söylemlere karşı çıkar. Bu çalışmalardan bazıları da Müslüman kadınların ve onların iradelerini kullanmalarına dair konuların tarihsel ve mekânsal bağlamda yapılması gerektiğini savunur. Her ne kadar bu konuda yapılan çalışmalar olsa da, bu konu daha fazla araştırmaya ve yeniden ele alınmaya muhtaçtır. Bu çalışmada, bu konuyu çok yönlü, Müslüman kadınların deneyimlerini, isteklerini ve uygulamalarını ilişkisel ve mekânsal olarak ele alma imkânı vereceğinden, ilk olarak irade ve özgürlük kavramlarını Deleuze felsefesi temelinde ele alınmaktadır. Diğer bir deyişle, Fransız filozof Gilles Deleuze’a dayandırılan ilişkisel ontolojik bakış açısı Müslüman kadına dair tartışmalara uygulanmaktadır. Bu ilişkisel ontolojiye göre, dünya bedenlerin toplamından oluşur. Her varlık, biyolojik organizma, sosyal yapı ve soyut yapı bir bedendir. Bu bedenlerin her birisi, ister insan bedeni ister insana ait olmayan bir beden olsun, ister maddi ister madde dışı olsun, ister sosyal ister psikolojik yapılar olsun, ilişkilerin akımı ile şekillendirilir. İnsan bedeninin biyolojik, zihinsel, sosyal ve psikolojik bileşenlerini içine alan her yönü de çoklu ilişkiler ile oluşturulur. Bu yüzden, bir insan öznesi hakkında konuştuğumuzda, aslında karmaşık ve çoklu ilişkilere dair konuşuruz. Bedenin bu şekilde ele alınması irade kavramının da yeniden ele alınmasını gerektirir. İrade kavramının bu bağlamda ele alınması dikkati bedenleri üreten ilişkiler üzerine odaklar. Bedenler ilişkilerin akımı ile şekillendirildiği için, bedenlerin belirli şekillerde hissetme, davranma ve istemeye dair kapasiteleri de sahip oldukları ilişkilere göre şekillenir. Bu ilişkisel ontoloji temelinde, Müslüman kadınların bedenlerinin ilişkilerin akımı ile şekillenen çoklu elementlerin karmaşık bir araya gelişler olarak ele alınmalıdır. Bu kavramlaştırma Müslüman kadınların hayatının izole edilmiş dini gelenekler temelinde oluşmuş gibi resmedilmesini sorgulatmaktadır. Müslüman kadınların iradeleri, kapasiteleri ve sınırlılıkları kadar deneyimleri, pratikleri ve istekleri de sosyal-politik söylemler, aile içi ilişkiler, materyal yapılar ve ekonomik şartlar gibi çoklu faktörler ile kurulan ilişkiler üzerinden şekillenir. Diğer bir ifade ile bu kadınların belirli şekillerde davranmaya dair güçleri kendilerini çevreleyen bedenler ile kurdukları ilişkilere göre şekillenir. Bu bedenler dini veya seküler unsurlar olabilir, insan veya insana ait olmayan unsurlar olabilir, ya da maddi veya madde dışı faktörler olabilir. Sonuç olarak, Müslüman kadınların bedenleri ve irade gösterme şekilleri her zaman bir süreklilik içinde bağlantı kuran veya bağlantılarını koparan çeşitli elementler ile üretilmektedir. Deleuze felsefesi temelindeki bu beden ve irade kavramlaştırmaları Müslüman kadınların dini geleneklerine salt itaat temelinde resmedilmelerini sorgulamak için kullanılmaktadır. Bu kadınların hayatlarındaki çoklu yapısal denebilecek elementlerin aydınlatılması amaçlanmakta ve onların iradelerinin parçalı ve ilişkisel bir şekilde anlaşılması önerilmektedir. İlişkisel ontolojik lensler aracılığı ile Müslüman kadınlar resmedilirken görünmez kılınan veya fotoğrafın dışında bırakılan dinamik ve heterojen unsurlar tetkik edilmektedir. Bu amaç için, Deleuze felsefesi temelinde yapılan kavramlaştırılmalar 2018’de doktora çalışması için Başkent Kadın Platformunda yapılan bir röportaja ve Türkiye’deki bazı etnografik gözlemlere uygulanmaktadır. Ortaya konulan teorik bağlama daha uygun olacağından, bir gruptan ya da daha geniş bir çerçevede veri toplamak yerine, bu röportajdan elde edilen verilerin detaylı bir şekilde ele alınması amaçlanmaktadır. Bu ontolojik bakış açısını Müslüman Kadın konusuna uygulayarak, Müslüman kadınların hayatındaki çoklu ve ilişkisel etken güçlere odaklanılması amaçlanmaktadır. Müslüman kadının yalnızca dini söylemler temelinde negatif olarak tanımlanması sorgulanmakta ve Müslüman kadınların deneyimlerini ve uygulamalarını anlamak için alternatif modeller olabileceğine dikkat çekilmektedir. Diğer bir şekilde ifade etmek gerekirse Müslüman kadınların deneyimleri ilişkisel, çok yönlü, parçalı ve muayyen olarak ele alınmalıdır. Hayal edilen tekil bir grup yerine, çok yönlülüğün ve ilişkiselliğin keşfedilmesine ihtiyaç duyulmaktadır. Bu yüzden Müslüman kadınların belirli zeminler temelinde anlaşılmaya çalışılması önerilmektedir. Bu tur bir analizde, bir araştırmacının amacı Müslüman kadını çok yönlü bir özne ve irade anlayışı temelinde belirli zeminlerde keşfetmek olmalıdır ki iç içe geçmiş baskı ve özgürleşme şekilleri de anlaşılabilsin. Müslüman kadının kimliğinin kategorileştirilmesi ve marjinalleştirilmesi yerine, devam edegelen şekilde deneyimlerin ve uygulamaların oluşum ve yeniden oluşumlarının üzerinde durulmalıdır. (shrink)

When widespread use of sex‐selective abortion and sex selection through assisted reproduction lead to severe harms to third parties and perpetuate discrimination, should these practices be banned? In this paper I focus on India and show why a common argument for a ban on sex selection fails even in these circumstances. I set aside a common objection to the argument, namely that women have a right to procreative autonomy that trumps the state's interest in protecting other parties from harm, and (...) argue against the ban on consequentialist grounds. I perform a pairwise comparative analysis of sex selection and its plausible alternatives and argue that that the ban fails to improve the state of affairs relative to a scenario without a ban. The ban makes the situation worse, especially for mothers and their daughters. India should therefore repeal its ban on sex selection. (shrink)

Epistemic decision theory produces arguments with both normative and mathematical premises. I begin by arguing that philosophers should care about whether the mathematical premises (1) are true, (2) are strong, and (3) admit simple proofs. I then discuss a theorem that Briggs and Pettigrew (2020) use as a premise in a novel accuracy-dominance argument for conditionalization. I argue that the theorem and its proof can be improved in a number of ways. First, I present a counterexample that shows that one (...) of the theorem’s claims is false. As a result of this, Briggs and Pettigrew’s argument for conditionalization is unsound. I go on to explore how a sound accuracy-dominance argument for conditionalization might be recovered. In the course of doing this, I prove two new theorems that correct and strengthen the result reported by Briggs and Pettigrew. I show how my results can be combined with various normative premises to produce sound arguments for conditionalization. I also show that my results can be used to support normative conclusions that are stronger than the one that Briggs and Pettigrew’s argument supports. Finally, I show that Briggs and Pettigrew’s proofs can be simplified considerably. (shrink)

We introduce a fairness criterion that we call Spanning. Spanning i) is implied by Calibration, ii) retains interesting properties of Calibration that some other ways of relaxing that criterion do not, and iii) unlike Calibration and other prominent ways of weakening it, is consistent with Equalized Odds outside of trivial cases.

This festschrift includes a dozen essays on issues that have been at the focus of Kai Nielsen's research, mainly issues in ethics and political philosophy. Among these are four essays on socialism and Marxism. There are also essays on philosophy of religion, epistemology, and meta-philosophy.

First-ever comprehensive introduction to the major new subject of quantum computing and quantum information.

ARGUMENT ABOUT whether in any significant sense we can derive an ought from an is has been persistent and intractable. Fifteen to twenty years ago it was orthodoxy in analytical philosophical circles to claim that for all their other differences Hume and Moore were right in agreeing that in no significant sense can we derive an ought from an is. At present there is no orthodoxy or even anything like a dominant view and, given our current understanding of how language (...) works and our understanding of moral and ideological discourse, we could not possibly reasonably remain content with old orthodoxies or take the question to be as straightforward as it was often thought to be. (shrink)

This essay has two aims. The first is to correct an increasingly popular way of misunderstanding Belot's Orgulity Argument. The Orgulity Argument charges Bayesianism with defect as a normative epistemology. For concreteness, our argument focuses on Cisewski et al.'s recent rejoinder to Belot. The conditions that underwrite their version of the argument are too strong and Belot does not endorse them on our reading. A more compelling version of the Orgulity Argument than Cisewski et al. present is available, however---a point (...) that we make by drawing an analogy with de Finetti's argument against mandating countable additivity. Having presented the best version of the Orgulity Argument, our second aim is to develop a reply to it. We extend Elga's idea of appealing to finitely additive probability to show that the challenge posed by the Orgulity Argument can be met. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Pettigrew reports a generalization of the celebrated accuracy-dominance theorem due to Predd et al., but Pettigrew’s proof is incorrect. I will explain the mistakes and provide a correct proof.

Noted philosopher Kai Nielsen offers an answer to this fundamental question - a question that reaches in to grasp at the very heart of ethics itself. Essentially, this innocent inquiry masks a confusion that so many of us get caught in as we think about moral issues. We fail to realize that there is a difference between judging human behavior within an ethical context, or set of moral principles, and justifying the principles themselves. According to Nielsen, it is (...) precisely this basic muddle that has spawned all sorts of challenges to morality, from relativism and intuitionism to egoism and skepticism. Nielsen first argues the case for these challenges in the strongest possible terms; then he shows that their failure to establish themselves demonstrates a fundamental flaw - an inability to understand what it means to have good reasons for the moral claims we make. In his search for "good reasons," Nielsen must face the innocent question "Why be moral?" He tries to show us that skirmishes among supporters of specific moral principles require a different sort of resolution than those that occur between groups of ethical principles. Justifying an action within a moral point of view is quite different from making the case for having a moral point of view in the first place. In its relentless search for the very basis of morality and the limits of moral justification, Why Be Moral? outlines the essential questions that will help us clear away confusion. Nielsen's approach will interest and delight informed readers and professionals alike. This vital work addresses itself to thoughtful people everywhere who are perplexed about morality and about the foundations of the moral life. (shrink)

Criticism of post-modernizm and post-colonializm caused to question the mission of anthropology in terms of understanding different societies. Materialist, secular and anthropocentric anthropological approaches based on enlightenment and modern assumptions have faced criticism by many disciplines from philosophy and critical theory to science and quantum theory. Anthropology of religion which is a branch of cultural anthropology is also effected by changes within the broader field of anthropology. The aim of this project is to shed light on the potential of the (...) critical approach, which emerged in anthropology of religion recently and underlined the ontology, to understand religious experiences and practices of different societies. This approach is called ontological turn. In this article, first I point out the historical process in anthropology which led to the turn to ontology. Social structuralism and representationalism which played an important role for the formation of anthropology impacted significantly the ways in which anthropology understands nature and human being. According to these assumptions commonly used in anthropology, while human beings try to understand universal and static natural law principles, they create representations about nature. But, for there is only one nature, there must be only one true representation. This attempt to understand nature through representations created the base for the concepts of belief, knowledge, and mind of Edward Tylor who was the pioneer of cultural anthropology. While the mind refers to rational capacity of human being, belief is an area of irrational representations that human beings pragmatically need. Religious assumptions and practices are listed under incorrect representations. The concept of belief has been frequently used after Tylor as well to understand societies which are located outside of modernity. What ontological turn aims with criticism of conceptual framework is to prevent the domination of Western based reality. Therefore, one of the most emphasized arguments is the multiplicity of reality. This approach of ontological turn is called as taking everything serious. New definitions which are made in a way including the experiences of ethnographic objects mean taking them serious. Acceptance of the concepts by anthropologist in the ethnographic field means acceptance of difference in reality. The act of definition and conceptualizing is the act of creating different realities. In many ethnographic researches, ethnographers choses their concepts before entering to the field. This means that trying to fit differences within existing concepts and confirming the existing thoughts from different perspectives. Understanding ethnographic materials with its own terms or analyzing, explaining or interpreting ethnographic phenomenon by eliminating presumptions was always a concern for anthropology. These questions are asked so commonly that they can be seen as banal questions. The difference of ontological turn is not to ask these questions, but to ask ontological questions as an epistemological approach. The base of this ontological approach is the thought that what forms anthropologists’ perspective are not social or cultural but ontological assumptions. Thus, the question to be asked is how anthropologists’ assumptions about what the world is can be eliminated. To sum up, the idea of taking everything serious in ontological turn aims to eliminate the hierarchy between the subject and object of ethnography. Instead of seeing ethnography as an object of anthropology through modern categories, ontological turn suggests seeing ethnography as a real source to create new concepts and analytical tools. (shrink)

The best accuracy arguments for probabilism apply only to credence functions with finite domains, that is, credence functions that assign credence to at most finitely many propositions. This is a significant limitation. It reveals that the support for the accuracy-first program in epistemology is a lot weaker than it seems at first glance, and it means that accuracy arguments cannot yet accomplish everything that their competitors, the pragmatic (Dutch book) arguments, can. In this paper, I investigate the extent to which (...) this limitation can be overcome. Building on the best arguments in finite domains, I present two accuracy arguments for probabilism that are perfectly general—they apply to credence functions with arbitrary domains. I then discuss how the arguments’ premises can be challenged. We will see that it is particularly difficult to characterize admissible accuracy measures in infinite domains. (shrink)

Sevgi, Mâtürîdî ahlak anlayışının dayandığı genel karakterlerden biridir. Ahlak içerisinde iradi bir eylem ön planda yer almış olsa da aslında bu eylem sevgi temeline dayanaklık etmektedir. Mâtürîdî’nin sevgi anlayışının temelinde, varlıklara sevginin Allah tarafından verildiğinin bilinmesi gerekliliği vardır. Çünkü insan fıtratında olan bu duygunun yani sevginin, sıradan bir yönelimin dışına çıkması ve insanı yücelten bir nitelik kazandırması bu temele dayanmaktadır. Mâtürîdî, her insanda doğuştan gelen bir güzellik eğilimi ya da güzel olana sevgi besleme gibi bir yatkınlığın olduğunu ifade etmiştir. Allah (...) sevgisinin de insanda fıtri bir duygu olduğu düşüncesindedir. Yaratılıştan gelen bu duygu kişiyi ahlaki açıdan Rabbinin rızasını kazanma ve insanın Rabbini sevme düşüncesinden ayrı değildir. Kendisine karşı sevgi duyulan bir Allah düşüncesi kişide övülen ahlaki fiillere yönlendiren önemli bir unsur olarak görülmektedir. Bu temel sevgi anlayışının bilinmesi, kişinin kendisiyle yüceleceği bir erdeme dönüşmesine zemin hazırlamaktadır. Mâtürîdî’nin izahlarında genellikle fiilde sevgiyi Allah ile bağlantılı olarak ele aldığını görmekteyiz. Ayrıca sevgi erdemi (el-Fadl fi’l-Mevedde), bir fiili gerçekleştirirken Yaratan’ın memnun olması için onu severek yapmak ve sevmediği bir fiilden de sırf O memnun olmayacağı için uzaklaşmak düşüncesini içinde barındırır. Mâtürîdî’nin izahlarının genelinde Allah’tan korkma anlamında “takva” ve bu kökten türeyen kelimelerde içinde sevgiyi barındıran bir korku olduğu vurgulanmaktadır. Ayrıca ifrat ve tefrite düşerek ‘orta yol’dan ayrılanın durumu da ‘takva’ya uygunluktan uzaklaşmakla eşittir. Öyle ki takvaya uygun olan fiilin ifrattan, tefritten uzakta ve ortada, dengeli olması gereklidir. Ayrıca Mâtürîdî adaleti ‘orta yol’ olarak tanımlar ve bir şeyin orta yolunun adalet üzere olmasına bağlar. Bir başka açıdan buna, ‘fiillerde hikmetli davranmak’ da diyebiliriz. Zaten Mâtürîdî’ye göre ‘Hikmet’ isabet etmek demektir. Yani her şeyin yerli yerine konulmasıdır. Mâtürîdî, kalpteki sevgi duygusunun hakikatinin bilinemeyeceğini ifade ederken insandaki muhabbet duygusunun da ancak kendisinden fayda gördüğü kişiye olacağını, fayda görmediği kişiye sevgi duyamayacağını ifade eder. Mâtürîdî’ye göre insan neyin kendisi için iyi olduğunu veya neyin kötü olduğunu, hakiki amaçlarının neler olması gerektiğini belirlemeye çalışan ve erdemli bir yaşayışı nasıl gerçekleştirmesi gerektiğini anlamlandırmakla görevli olan bir varlıktır. İnsanın ahlaki yapısına baktığımızda da hangi gayeler etrafında yaşam sürmesi gerektiğini, iyi ve kötünün, ödev ve sorumlulukların belirlenmesi gibi düşüncelerin insan varlığında ahlaki temel bir amaca dayandığını ya da dayanması gerektiğini görmekteyiz. Biz de bu çalışmamızda Mâtürîdî ahlakına felsefi bir bakışla kavramsal olarak sevgiyi nasıl anlamlandırdığını ele almaya çalışacağız. (shrink)

It is generally accepted that morally justified healthcare rationing must be non-discriminatory and cost-effective. However, given conventional concepts of cost-effectiveness, resources spent on disabled people are spent less cost-effectively, ceteris paribus, than resources spent on non-disabled people. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that standard cost-effectiveness discriminates against the disabled. Call this thedisability discrimination problem.Part of the disability discrimination involved in cost-effectiveness stems from the way in which health-related quality of life is accounted for and measured. This paper offers and (...) defends a patient-sensitive account of health-related quality of life, which can effectively make cost-effectiveness less discriminatory against the disabled and thus more morally justified. (shrink)